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Saving Begins at 
Home
Ultimately, Latin America’s low saving rate can be traced back to indi-
vidual households throughout the region. Why do they—or do they 
not—save and how? Answering this question is not an easy task. Under-
standing how people make their saving decisions demands more than 
an analysis of how the financial system interacts with its individual sav-
ers. It requires a closer look into their communities, their homes—and 
even their minds.
Saving rates in Latin America and the Caribbean are low compared 
to other regions (Chapter 2). This chapter zooms in on households to 
find out why people in the region save so little. It evaluates some of 
the difficulties that households in the region encounter when they try 
to save, analyzes the effects of these constraints on their financial port-
folios, and identifies strategies that may boost household saving rates.
Constraints to Saving
Several factors can limit households’ saving choices. These constraints 
can affect either the choice to save formally or more generally, saving 
behavior.1
Too Hard to Save Formally?
Nothing in life is free, and saving is no exception. When saving is done 
through a formal financial institution, the monetary costs of managing 
a saving account make households think twice about opening or using 
the account, especially when yields do not compensate for these costs.2 
Given high transaction costs—ranging from opening fees and minimum 
balance requirements to transaction and withdrawal fees—many house-




In other parts of the world, reducing these monetary costs has proven 
to be effective in encouraging people to open formal saving products. 
Subsidies that cut the cost of opening and maintaining a bank account 
yielded take-up rates (i.e., new accounts opened among those that were 
offered) as high as 82 percent in Nepal (Prina, 2015) and between 47 
percent and 62 percent in Kenya (Dupas et al., 2016; Dupas and Robin-
son, 2013a). In the Philippines, programs that reduce transaction costs 
also have had positive, albeit more modest, effects in inspiring people 
to open formal saving accounts (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2006). How-
ever, better financial conditions such as higher interest rates have had 
only a limited effect on households’ usage of formal saving accounts in 
Chile (Kast, Meier, and Pomeranz, 2012) and the Philippines (Karlan and 
Zinman, 2014). Even when financial institutions offer large, subsidized 
marginal yields, people often respond little to these incentives.
In recent years, various Latin American and Caribbean countries 
have made major regulatory advances to promote basic or simplified 
saving accounts with low transaction costs. Other interesting cost-cut-
ting innovations include the expansion of agent banking and the use of 
virtual technologies to extend the reach of formal financial institutions 
to underserved geographical areas. Despite their tremendous poten-
tial and their rapidly growing popularity in several countries, regulatory 
challenges and other barriers still limit their expansion. On the one hand, 
regulatory frameworks that authorize the use of agent banking in the 
region have developed only slowly. On the other hand, several issues 
arise when trying to regulate mobile wallets, phone banking and other 
virtual technologies. In several Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
regulation deters the use of these technologies since only authorized 
financial institutions are allowed to collect deposits from the public.3
Credible and well-designed regulation may also help address 
another formidable barrier to formal saving: lack of trust. Latin America’s 
long record of financial crises and bank runs is etched in the memories of 
potential savers. Following “lack of money,” “lack of trust in banks” is the 
number two reason given for not having a formal account, as reported 
in the Global Financial Inclusion (Global FINDEx) database (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Klapper, 2012). Globally, Latin America and the Caribbean 
ranks highest among regions in terms of this barrier, well above East 
Asia and the Pacific (see Figure 9.1). Unfortunately, there is no causal evi-
dence linking the lack of trust in banks with the level of formal savings in 
an economy. Since trust takes years to build and draws on personal and 
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social history as well as other contextual factors, it is hard to isolate its 
effect on formal saving rates.
The region’s tortuous history of financial crises may not be the only 
reason behind people’s distrust of banks. Information or knowledge 
gaps may also be to blame. After all, it is hard to ask someone to trust 
something they do not know or barely understand.
The current state of financial literacy in the region is disappointing. 
According to a survey by García et al., (2013), the majority of the popula-
tion in Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru does not understand 
the term “interest rate.” Inflation is another highly misunderstood concept, 
and thus very few people understand how to factor it into their calcula-
tions of the purchasing power of money.
Theoretically, reducing informational gaps should boost the use of 
formal saving products. However, the actual effect may be disappointing. 
Survey experiments conducted in Peru, Mexico, and Brazil evaluated the 
impact of providing poor and middle-income households with informa-
tion on bank products and yields on the hypothetical choice of opening 
a formal savings account (Frisancho and Karver, 2016). In all cases, the 
effect was modest at best.
In general, the effectiveness of interventions to improve financial 
literacy is discouraging, beyond a few notable exceptions (see Fer-
nandes, Lynch, and Netemeyer, 2014). Traditional financial literacy 
interventions may be failing not because of the content but because 
Figure 9.1 Lack of Trust as a Barrier to Open a Formal Bank Account
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Global FINDEx dataset (Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012).
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of the delivery strategies used. Standard classroom-like delivery meth-
ods have not worked well, but simpler and more agile financial literacy 
interventions seem promising. Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar (2014) 
compare two distinct financial literacy programs aimed at microen-
trepreneurs in the Dominican Republic. The first followed traditional 
financial education modules in a classroom-like environment. The sec-
ond was a simplified “rule-of-thumb” program. While the standard 
accounting program had almost no effect on business financial and 
profit outcomes, the simplified training resulted in better accounting 
practices and higher profits.
All in all, the most effective policy by far to increase access to formal 
saving instruments is removing initial transactional barriers. However, 
while policy interventions that help reduce transaction costs are effective 
in persuading people to open accounts, they are far less so in convinc-
ing people to use them (see Frisancho, 2016). Most likely, other factors 
affect household saving decisions more generally. To understand this 
side of the problem requires nothing less than looking into the minds of 
Latin American savers and analyzing their cultural and personal biases—
a formidable task indeed.
In the Hearts and Minds of Savers
Family and Friends First
It’s hard to say no to a family member in need, especially in a culture 
like that of Latin America that places a high value on the extended fam-
ily. Despite the insurance benefits that extended networks of family and 
friends may offer, they can also represent a drain on a household’s time 
and resources and ultimately impose demands on their accumulated 
stock of savings. These demands are particularly high in Latin Amer-
ica, where private transfers among households represent, on average, 
36 percent of per capita labor income (Lee and Mason, 2011a).4 The high 
rate of private transfers may also explain the small balances but large 
cash flows that the relatively poor manage (see Chapter 2). Moreover, the 
poor spend considerable sums on weddings, festivities, and funerals—
celebrations that often include their extended family and/or their social 
network of friends and neighbors (Collins et al., 2010 and Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2007). Social pressure to share income and assets may discour-
age asset accumulation, encourage a fast turnover of resources, or even 
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induce costly behavior such as strategic borrowing to hide resources 
and preempt requests for transfers (Baland, Guirkinger, and Mali, 2011).
Latin America is not the only place where social pressure affects 
portfolio allocation (Jakiela and Ozier, 2016). In Kenya, villagers were 
randomly assigned an initial sum of money and asked to put that 
money in either a savings account with private balances or an invest-
ment account. In the case of the investment accounts, information 
about their returns could be either public or private, or they could pay 
a fee to keep the information private. Women, but not men, were will-
ing to forego expected income in order to keep their returns a secret 
from others in their village. Women with large sums of money and pub-
lic returns invested 6.5 percent less in a business opportunity than 
women with less money who could keep the returns private. Essen-
tially, the study finds that women face an average “kinship” tax of 
about 4 percent of income.5
The burden that a social network imposes can be hard to escape. 
Fear of social shame and ostracism, as well as reciprocity, can be 
great, especially in close-knit communities. In India, the extent to which 
households help each other financially, and thus provide interpersonal 
insurance, varies with social proximity (Chandrasekhar, Kinnan, and Lar-
reguy, 2012). Among very connected households, the level of transfers 
does not change when a savings instrument is provided. Essentially, 
family and friends trump personal savings and investment. Thus, the 
demands of social networks limit the stock of savings the poor can accu-
mulate and divert resources away from productive uses.
In addition to pressure across households, tension between mem-
bers of the same household also constrains saving. More than one 
marriage has been strained when one partner makes monetary choices 
for the household. The reasons for this tension stem from differences 
between spouses in terms of their bargaining power, intertemporal pref-
erences (Schaner, 2015; Browning, 2000), risk tolerance, or even tastes 
in consumer goods (Anderson and Baland, 2002). Strategic behavior by 
both partners can lead to inefficient saving choices.
Differences in saving goals within a household may be explained by 
differences in the rate at which husbands and wives discount the future. 
Since women live longer than men and tend to be younger than their 
husbands, they may well have lower discount rates (Browning, 2000). 
The prospect of a longer retirement period without their husbands 
drives women to save more for old age.
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In Latin America and the Caribbean, women live an average of 73 
years, while men live only 68.9 years. This gap is even wider among 
developing countries within the region, with females living 77.7 years 
and males 71.6 Moreover, women in Latin America tend to marry older 
men. Among couples with husbands aged between 30 and 50, irrespec-
tive of the number of children, about half the households in Brazil consist 
of husbands who are four or more years older than their wives—almost 
double the share of households with wives who are the same age or 
older than their husbands (see Table 9.1). The age gap is similar in Mexico 
and somewhat less skewed in Peru, but still relatively high.
viewing households as groups of individuals helps explain the risk 
sharing arrangements that take place within the unit. By definition, two-
person households face less income risk than single-person households 
dependent on a single source of income. If someone at home loses his or 
her job, two-person households have to adjust their consumption less than 
single-person households. In the same vein, two-person households are 
less affected by the removal of public insurance, such as unemployment 
insurance, both in terms of savings and the accumulation of assets. Mul-
tiple-person households can indeed insure their members by strategizing 
over labor supply (who in the household will work, at what kinds of work, 
and when) depending on the generosity of the public insurance available.7
In sum, decision-making both within and across households and 
intra-household insurance mechanisms may lead to suboptimal saving 
choices. Although it is hard to tackle these issues directly when they 
constrain saving, they need to be considered in the design of financial 
services and public insurance programs. For example, in settings where 
pressure to share with other family members or friends is high, hard 









Wife older 24.1 16.4 16.2 17.9 17.9 16.5
Same age 12.9 12.9 10.5 10.4 6.8 8.4
Husband 1–3 years older 26.3 26.8 33.1 31.3 26.5 26.3
Husband 4–5 years older 12.1 13.9 12.7 13.5 15.5 13.5
Husband more than 5 years older 24.5 30.0 27.5 26.9 33.3 35.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Base of Pyramid (BoP) Survey.
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commitment saving accounts can be useful instruments for households 
trying to accumulate a stock of savings (Brune et al., 2015).
A Behavioral Economics Tale
Even if there were no constraints to saving formally, saving levels could 
still suffer if individual biases influenced saving choices. Ultimately, sav-
ing is a personal decision subject to an individual’s needs, wants, and 
even personality.
The Penchant for Instant Gratification
The economics and psychology literature have both documented the 
importance of time preferences in saving decisions (Frederick, Loew-
enstein, and O’Donoghue, 2002; Dellavigna, 2009). Individuals with 
present-biased preferences find it extremely hard to postpone con-
sumption, even if it comes at the expense of their future welfare. Thus, 
they consume today, instead of saving for tomorrow. The more immedi-
ate the reward, the harder it is for them to postpone consumption: that 
is, their preferences may be time-inconsistent. Preferences of this sort 
lead people to procrastinate in various aspects of their lives: starting 
a diet, writing a boring report, or renewing a driver’s license. They find 
it particularly hard to save whenever self-control mechanisms are not 
incorporated into their choices.
Several recent studies have tried to measure the correlation of 
present-biased preferences with under-saving. These efforts have typi-
cally involved small sample sizes in randomized controlled trials or case 
studies. A noteworthy exception is Wang, Rieger, and Hens (2011), who 
measure impatience and time discounting in 45 countries, though still 
relying on small samples of university students (see Box 9.1).
Time preferences may vary by nation or region. Using nationally rep-
resentative data at the urban level for Peru, Mexico, and Brazil, Frisancho 
and Karver (2016) measure time preferences by asking individuals to 
hypothetically choose between a small reward today and a larger one 
in a month. They then compare their answers for the same question but 
set in a more distant time frame, six to seven months from now. Individu-
als who choose the smaller reward now rather than waiting for a larger 
reward in a month, but claim that they would be willing to wait for the 
larger reward six months from now, are considered time-inconsistent.8 
About 40 percent of the urban population in Mexico, Peru, and Brazil has 
224 SAvING FOR DEvELOPMENT
time-inconsistent preferences. More importantly, about one-third of the 
urban population in these countries can be considered hyperbolic dis-
counters: they penalize the passage of time more strongly today than 
they do in the future (see Frisancho and Karver [2016] for more details).
Hyperbolic discounters have a harder time saving because of their 
present-biased preferences. They also may be more likely to borrow 
whenever they need cash. In Peru, hyperbolic discounters are 14 per-
centage points less likely to save than people who are always patient. In 
Mexico, hyperbolic discounters are 10 percentage points more likely to 
be indebted than those who are consistently patient. In Brazil, the prob-
ability of saving is 8 percentage points lower for hyperbolic discounters 
relative to people who are always patient (Frisancho and Karver, 2016).
Overall, an important share of the population in Latin America and the 
Caribbean may benefit from commitment devices that help them save. 
Those who are conscious of their present-biased preferences will actively 
demand financial products that help them exercise self-control—like indi-
viduals who find a “gym buddy” to motivate them to exercise. People 
who are not fully aware of these biases could also benefit by being pre-
sented with default or opt-out schemes since procrastination itself and/
or inertia will deter or at least delay an active choice to opt out (Dellavi-
gna and Malmendier, 2006). Mandatory pension plans are in essence a 
way to deal with the tendency to postpone saving for retirement.
Helping people deal with their self-control problems is effective at 
increasing saving.9 Since time-inconsistent individuals face a disconnect 
between their present self and their future self, they need a commitment 
device to keep up with their initial savings plan. The commitment device 
can include penalties, such as interest rate reductions or fees. A seminal 
study by Thaler and Benartzi (2004) shows that behavioral econom-
ics can be effectively used to design prescriptive policies: by offering 
people the option to commit in advance to allocating a portion of their 
future salary increases toward retirement savings, the program “Save 
More Tomorrow™” increased saving rates from 3.5 percent to 13.6 per-
cent in a span of 40 months.
A commitment product provided by a bank in the Philippines allowed 
savers to choose between time-based and amount-based maturities. 
Among those who opened the account, saving balances increased by 
over 300 percent relative to the control group. Not surprisingly, savings 
increased the most among those initially identified as time-inconsistent. 
These people are precisely the ones whose time preferences are more 
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likely to limit their saving choices in the absence of a commitment device 
(Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2006).
In settings where the supply of formal products is limited, com-
mitment devices may take the form of informal arrangements, such as 
saving groups or rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs).10 
Members meet to make regular lump-sum contributions that they pool 
and give to one member of the group in each meeting. These groups are 
usually formed within an existing social network, which guarantees that 
the imposed commitment is binding. In Chile, such self-help peer groups 
were implemented among microentrepreneurs as a commitment device 
to encourage precautionary savings (Kast, Meier, and Pomeranz, 2012). 
The number of deposits grew by about 350 percent and savings bal-
ances almost doubled among clients in the treatment group.
How strong should the commitments be? Imposing liquidity restric-
tions that are too strict runs the risk of scaring participants away (Ashraf, 
Karlan, and Yin, 2006). The trade-off between commitment and flexibil-
ity is a recurring issue in the design of financial products and services. 
Although there is a demand for products that tie one’s hands in the 
future so he can reach his current saving goals, unexpected shocks may 
force households to break their commitment. In such cases, strong com-
mitment devices may even reduce welfare. The right balance between 
commitment and flexibility is hard to strike and depends on the set-
ting as well as the specific saving motives of the targeted population 
and their exposure to uninsured risks. For instance, strong commitment 
accounts may be more suitable for saving for a specific goal or a planned 
expenditure/investment, rather than simply for a rainy day (Dupas and 
Robinson, 2013b).
Commercial commitment products being developed in the region 
contain a contract specifying a savings plan with a goal to be achieved in 
a fixed number of installments. Additional incentives are usually offered 
for those who keep up with their plan, such as preferential interest rates 
or participation in raffles. Although penalties can also be used to deter 
individuals from missing an installment, these are rarely implemented, 
especially when the product is first launched. While some products 
involve a social commitment, many others rely on individual commit-
ments and/or labelling to help users follow their saving plan.11
The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) has been promoting indi-
vidual scheduled saving accounts in the region with varying degrees of 
commitments and rewards.12 Preliminary results suggest that take-up 
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rates for commitment devices are high, but usage tends to decline over 
time. Procrastination or lack of attention reduces the incentives to make 
deposits over time. Thus, to ensure that people continue to make depos-
its, they may need additional features built into the product. Using 
reminders or capitalizing on some of the problem-solving biases dis-
cussed in the next section, such as inertia, may be effective tools to 
increase saving balances among households in the region.13
Inertia and Limited Attention: Not All Bad
Most economic models assume that people process all available infor-
mation in a rational and optimal way. But in real life, people make bad 
(and conscious) choices. Does this mean they are not rational optimiz-
ing agents?
Not necessarily. Psychological or cognitive biases also affect deci-
sions. Sometimes people use less information than is available because 
it is hard to process—especially when a choice is urgent. Other times, 
people may act on hunches just because they are overconfident about 
their own opinion on a given matter. In other words, individuals tend to 
make decisions based on mental “rules of thumb,” or heuristics (Kahne-
man, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982).14
Two such psychological biases are important determinants of saving 
behavior: inertia and limited attention. The first emerges from a pref-
erence for the status quo: the current state is perceived as a reference 
point and any deviation from it is perceived as a loss. Whenever taking 
an action imposes some sort of transaction cost, people who prefer the 
status quo (a tendency toward cognitive inertia) will have a harder time 
incurring that cost.
Preferences characterized by inertia lead to habits. Some people 
tend to go to the same places and order the same dishes when they go 
out for lunch or dinner, for example. These are safe choices; they repeat 
them because they represent the status quo and they are satisfied with 
the outcome. Finding a new place to eat or trying a new dish incurs a 
search cost and poses the risk of not liking the new choice, so there is 
a tendency not to change. This is why automatic enrollment plans have 
been successful in many settings, especially in consumer markets. Many 
promotional campaigns provide a given good or service at a reduced 
rate for a short period of time, after which automatic enrollment kicks in 
at the regular rate. Surprisingly, many individuals find it easier to keep 
paying the higher price than to cancel the service.
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Limited attention can also lead to poor choices if information is 
neglected. In many countries, for example, retail stores must list the 
final price of their products, including taxes. This is a common prac-
tice because consumers tend to forget to factor in the additional cost of 
taxes when buying goods.
When individuals succumb to limited or selective attention, they 
are more prone to make mistakes or distort their choices. People can 
have trouble forecasting their future expenditures, for example, which 
can affect their saving behavior. Planning tools that force people to list 
all the elements of their household consumption basket, for instance, 
can help them pay attention to frequently overlooked details when fore-
casting their consumption. Evidence from Frisancho and Karver (2016) 
provides an example along these lines. Households were asked two dif-
ferent questions: “Do you or anyone in the household save regularly?” 
and “In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in the household saved 
using […formal/informal saving instruments…].” Notably, households 
respond very differently to these two questions. When asked about 
whether they save in general, households misreport their actual saving 
behavior. Among those who claim not to save in general, 39 percent, 23 
percent, and 15 percent of the households in Peru, Mexico, and Brazil, 
respectively, report saving when asked whether they use each possible 
financial instrument, one at a time.
Inertia and limited attention need not work against saving activity. 
On the contrary, they can be tapped to actually boost saving levels. First, 
capitalizing on inertia, the optimal saving level can be made the default. 
Individuals who tend to prefer the status quo find it harder to opt out of 
saving. In this way, inertia serves as a constraint for the person to stop 
saving. Automatic discounts or direct deposits may help mobilize sav-
ings in settings where income flows, such as wages, are intermediated by 
some individual or institution other than the saver. Contributions to pen-
sion plans intermediated through the employer seize this opportunity 
to help people save for retirement. Banks in more financially developed 
settings have incorporated this feature into several commercial prod-
ucts: an example is automatic deductions for savings for individuals who 
receive their wages through a bank transfer.
The scant use of electronic transactions as a means of payment in 
developing countries limits the possibility of using default mechanisms to 
encourage savings. Nevertheless, recent efforts in the region have targeted 
cash transfer beneficiaries who receive their grants via direct deposit to 
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a bank account. Default devices linked to remittance receipts is another 
effective way to capitalize on inertia, since remittance recipients tend to 
receive an international wire transfer on a regular basis. Whenever income 
flows through a bank account, additional illiquid accounts can be linked 
to it to allow the recipient to choose automatic discounts to be saved.
The saving potential of such mechanisms is highlighted by a recent 
study on the effects of offering direct deposits of the proceeds from 
cash crop harvests in bank accounts in rural Malawi (Brune et al., 2015). 
Almost 300 farmers’ clubs, each with 10 to 20 members, were ran-
domly assigned to a control group or one of two treatment arms: a 
direct deposit account and a commitment saving account. The second 
arm offered the direct deposit account but added an additional illiquid 
account that allowed farmers to specify an amount to be transferred 
into it, as well as date-based maturity. Both treatment arms helped 
increase total savings balances, since all cash crop earnings were auto-
matically saved. However, the commitment account had a much larger 
effect: while the direct deposit account increased total balances by 280 
percent, savings increased 620 percent with the commitment account.
Inertia can also be capitalized on by promoting saving habits among 
children and youth. Instilling saving habits at a young age can gener-
ate new reference points or a status quo that incorporates saving in 
consumption decisions. Showing young people the value of delaying 
gratification could be a promising strategy to promote higher savings 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, where time preferences are biased 
more toward the present than in other regions.
Financial education for youth can yield important indirect effects 
beyond financial knowledge, attitudes, and outcomes. First, good finan-
cial habits are also linked to better outcomes in schooling, employment, 
and standards of living. Second, young people can be agents of change 
in their households, sharing knowledge they acquire with their parents 
and other siblings (Bruhn et al., 2013).
In Brazil, a financial education program in public high schools 
improved financial literacy. More importantly, the program seems to 
have benefited all students, irrespective of their initial level of perfor-
mance in a financial knowledge exam. Students in the treatment group 
were on average 12.5 percent more likely to save than the control group. 
The intervention also improved spending behavior: students in the treat-
ment group were more likely to compare prices, or negotiate prices 
or payment methods while shopping, and prepare monthly budgets. 
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Finally, the program also seems to have “trickle up” effects: parents in 
the treatment group scored higher in a financial literacy exam and were 
more likely to save (Bruhn et al., 2013).
A recent experiment with young account holders in Colombia 
explores the roles of limited information, limited self-control, and lim-
ited attention on saving behavior with a financial information campaign 
delivered through short message service (SMS) (Rodríguez and Saa-
vedra, 2015). A large-scale field experiment included three treatment 
arms in addition to a control group: a financial education campaign with 
monthly messages; and two treatments with monthly and bimonthly 
reminders to save. The better targeted reminders to save, regardless of 
their frequency, had important effects on account balances, mainly by 
reducing withdrawals. The financial knowledge campaign had no sig-
nificant effect on account balances, which suggests that informational 
and knowledge constraints were not binding in this sample.15
Lack of attention can also be tackled with appropriate reminders 
and nudges that help people achieve their saving goals. In daily life, peo-
ple who know they have a bad memory or lack attention resort to simple 
tricks to remind themselves of certain events or tasks: wearing a rubber 
band around their wrists, writing reminders on their hands or arms, plac-
ing Post-It notes on the bathroom mirror, or writing to-do lists. Similar 
strategies may work when it comes to savings. In Bolivia, Peru, and the 
Philippines, reminders with varying content helped achieve a 6 percent 
increase in saving balances and a 3 percentage point increase in the 
probability of reaching a given saving goal (Karlan et al., forthcoming).16
The timing and frequency of nudges or reminders may also be 
important. Certain times of the month or day may be better than others 
for reminding people to save. If, for instance, the household receives the 
reminder when cash is scarce, the impact of the nudge could be weak. 
There may be better times of the day to remind people about their exces-
sive expenditures and their saving goals, such as lunch or dinner time. In 
some cases, a one-time reminder may not be enough; if so, how many 
are effective? Finding the right balance between too few reminders and 
potential “harassment” is another important avenue for future research.
Policy Recommendations: What Really Counts
This chapter suggests three main strategies to promote household sav-
ing. First, there is a clear need for financial product innovation in the 
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region to encourage more saving, particularly via formal channels. For 
example, social constraints to save need to be considered in the design 
of financial services. Behavioral biases, which also constrain saving for a 
large share of the population, should also be incorporated in the design 
of financial products and services.
Second, formal institutions can and should learn from informal mech-
anisms currently serving the financial needs of poor households. These 
informal arrangements have emerged to cover the unmet needs of those 
excluded (and those who exclude themselves) from formal financial ser-
vices. Formalizing informal mechanisms whenever possible or through 
potential partnerships with formal institutions can help attract savings 
into the formal financial system.
Third, focusing on children and youth can foster positive saving hab-
its and potentially affect preferences that could increase saving rates in 
the future. Since some of the traits that limit saving choices are mal-
leable at younger ages but hard to modify in adults, early interventions 
may be able to impact time preferences and saving behavior. Given 
limited empirical evidence, more research is needed, and the research 




“The simpler a task, the more likely it is to be done,” conclude Karlan, 
Ratan, and Zinman (2014). Complicated paperwork, hidden fees, long 
lines to make a deposit, and burdensome trips to the bank all discourage 
clients from opening an account and/or continuing to use it. In a region 
where financial literacy is particularly low, financial institutions need to 
simplify processes to close information gaps that can limit the demand 
for saving services.
Tackle Behavioral Biases
About one-third of the population in urban Peru, Brazil, and Mexico exhib-
its hyperbolic time preferences. Moreover, according to the experimental 
evidence of Wang, Rieger, and Hens (2011) (see Box 9.1), the prevalence of 
present-biased preferences is higher in Latin America and the Caribbean 
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than in other regions. People with behavioral biases would benefit from 
commitment devices that would help them save. Consumers who are 
aware of these behavioral biases have tried to find informal or idiosyn-
cratic ways to deal with them via informal saving mechanisms such as 
ROSCAs. Formal suppliers of financial services could cater to time-incon-
sistent consumers with products that help them keep up with their saving 
goals. Scheduled saving plans and commitment accounts that correctly 
balance incentives and penalties could be effective instruments to bank 
the unbanked and help them increase their saving balances.
Among consumers who are not aware of their behavioral biases, 
introducing default mechanisms in developing financial markets could 
help them reach their goals. However, the advantages of these mech-
anisms can be better exploited in settings where income flows are 
intermediated through formal financial systems. Policymakers and finan-
cial institutions that join forces to bank the unbanked are thus a crucial 
foundation for providing saving products that respond to the needs of 
the households in the region.
Incorporate Technology
Technology can be helpful not only to simplify processes and trans-
actions but also to help individuals deal with their behavioral biases. 
Opening accounts and being able to manage them online, for example, 
may lead to higher take-up and usage rates. Cellphones and the internet 
facilitate transactions that could otherwise be postponed indefinitely 
by time-inconsistent individuals. Transferring money from a simplified 
account to a more illiquid one with a couple of clicks minimizes the role 
that behavioral biases may play.
Technology can also aid with reminders. The ubiquity of cellphones 
in the region makes text messages and mobile application software the 
ideal cost-effective channel to help people save.
Nevertheless, regulation must catch up with innovation. The onus is 
on financial regulators to ensure that local regulations do not deter the 
development of new saving products that rely on technology.
Keep Testing
High-income households in Latin America and the Caribbean save 
a relatively higher fraction of their incomes than poorer households 
232 SAvING FOR DEvELOPMENT
BOX 9.1. DO GENES AND CULTURE MATTER FOR SAVING?
Several studies have probed differences in saving behaviors across countries 
and agents to understand if there is a natural propensity to save. A series 
of studies in the 1970s used factor models to decompose the variance in IQ 
tests into its genetic and environmental components. However, estimates of 
the contribution of genetic components from this literature range widely and 
depend mainly on strong and restrictive assumptions about the factor load-
ings or about the distribution of the genetic and environmental components.a
A noteworthy study on the role of genetics in saving decisions was re-
cently conducted by Cronqvist and Siegel (2015) in Sweden. By exploiting 
the differences in genes shared among fraternal and identical twins, the study 
finds that genetic differences explain about one-third of the variation in indi-
vidual savings rates. Moreover, the study finds that saving rates are negatively 
correlated with smoking and obesity—behaviors that may also reflect lack 
of self-control and present-biased preferences—and that this correlation is 
largely explained by genetic factors.
Another innovative strand of the literature has focused on testing what is 
referred to as “linguistic relativity,” or the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis: Does the 
structure of a language affect the ways in which its speakers view the world? 
Can language influence the way speakers think and/or engage in nonlinguistic 
behaviors such as saving? A recent study by Chen (2013) evaluates whether 
speakers of languages that disassociate the present from the future have a 
harder time saving. He first classifies languages into strong and weak future-
time reference (FTR) languages, and finds that Spanish and English have strong 
future time-references, while Chinese has a weak one.b In other words, Chinese 
distinguish the differences between current and future events less strongly 
than Colombians, who tend to make a very clear distinction between the two.
With this language coding in hand, Chen (2013) finds that the degree of 
future-time references intrinsic in each language correlates highly with the 
way in which speakers deal with household and individual intertemporal deci-
sions such as health and saving choices. Furthermore, he shows that linguistic 
relativity may play an important role in national saving rates: countries with a 
strong FTR language save about 5 percentage points less per year than com-
parable countries with weak FTR languages.
Wang, Rieger, and Hens (2011) measure long-term discount rates (δ) and 
present-bias discount factors (β) in 45 countries around the world. Whenever 
δ=1, individuals give the same weight to gains/losses today and tomorrow; 
i.e., they do not penalize future events. Thus, low values of δ signify that they 
discount the future more heavily relative to the present. Individuals may also 
discount the future against the present differently depending on when the 
choice is made. Someone may care about an intertemporal trade-off between 
today and a week from now, but not so much between four and five weeks 
from now. Individuals with β=1, will not exhibit any present bias in their choices 
(continued on next page)
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(Chapter 2). This is particularly worrisome because lower income house-
holds face greater exclusion from credit and insurance markets, higher 
income volatility, and greater vulnerability to unexpected income shocks. 
The poor are also relatively more constrained than the rich in their access 
to formal saving products due to the higher burden imposed on them by 
monetary costs or by lower levels of financial literacy.
However, developing and testing prototypes of formal saving 
products to reach and be used by the poor may not be an appealing 
and will evaluate intertemporal trade-offs in the same light, irrespective of the 
time for receiving the reward/punishment.
Table B9.1 summarizes the study’s results. When grouped by cultural clus-
ters, the median values of the long-term discount rate (δ) remain quite stable 
across regions, mostly around 0.8. The only exception is Africa, which has a 
slightly smaller discount factor of 0.77, signaling a less patient attitude in the 
long term, which is consistent with very low levels of development in the conti-
nent. By contrast, there is a great deal of variation in the present-bias discount 
rate (β) across different cultural clusters. While Latin America and the Caribbean 
and East Asia have similar long-term discount rates, their present-bias discount 
rates differ. Latin Americans have a higher prevalence of present-biased prefer-
ences. The difference in median β between Latin America and the Caribbean 
and Anglo cultures is even greater: present-bias discount factors among the 
latter are almost 30 percent higher than in Latin America and the Caribbean.
a For a thorough survey and critique of these studies, see Goldberger (1979).
b By contrast, in other Asian countries where multiple languages are spoken, such as Singa-
pore and Malaysia, the main language spoken has a strong future-time reference.
Table B.9.1 Median Long-Term and Present-Bias Discount Factors
Long-term discount factor (δ) Present-bias discount factor (β)
Anglo 0.84 0.76
Middle East 0.80 0.62
East Asia 0.84 0.65
Latin Europe 0.82 0.60
Latin America 0.82 0.59
Germanic-Nordic 0.84 0.60
Africa 0.77 0.43
East Europe 0.79 0.38
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Wang, Rieger, and Hens (2011).
Note: The Anglo region includes Australia, United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, Canada, and 
the United States. Latin Europe includes France, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. 
BOX 9.1. (continued)
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enterprise for traditional financial institutions, and it may be extremely 
costly for nonprofit microfinance institutions that are struggling to sur-
vive. After all, the savings that the poor can mobilize amount to modest 
aggregate sums. This knowledge gap has been more or less covered 
by the academic community, whose interest in prototypes is increasing, 
and extensive randomized control trials all over the developing world. 
Nevertheless, academics’ incentives to publish and practitioners’ urge to 
find timely solutions that can be cheaply and quickly tested can limit the 
extent of experimenting that takes place.
Some efforts to coordinate these two sets of actors have emerged 
in the past few years. Innovation for Poverty Actions (IPA) has been 
active in promoting financial inclusion. It has launched several ini-
tiatives to connect policymakers and practitioners (matchmaking 
gatherings) and promote timely research to inform financial inclu-
sion efforts in the developing world. The Multilateral Investment Fund 
has also served as a laboratory to test financial products and services 
in the region, with a stronger emphasis on saving products in recent 
years. As the region and the world as a whole keep changing, these 
initiatives will be crucial for informing policymakers, practitioners, and 
financial institutions.
Bridging the Gap between Informal and Formal Mechanisms
Households excluded from formal financial markets meet their demand 
for financial services by relying on informal mechanisms that are fre-
quently linked to social networks. Although these informal services 
often charge very high fees and, in some cases, are insecure and unreli-
able, they remain popular. Some households may even prefer informal 
services over formal ones for a variety of reasons, such as their conve-
nience, ease of use, and trustworthiness (Lee, Ainslie, and Fathallah, 
2012). Providers of informal saving or credit instruments are usually 
already present in the clients’ social network, so access to them is 
extremely convenient. Moreover, transactions tend to occur without the 
hassle of paperwork or complicated contracts and are usually enforced 
by social norms. Despite the risk involved in these unregulated trans-
actions, households seem to perceive them as safer than those in the 
formal financial systems. These preferences may reflect their distrust of 
banks and/or confusion and disinformation about regulations and fee 
structures.
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In reality, informal instruments can be very costly or unsafe due to 
the demands of family and friends and the high probability of loss or 
theft. Moreover, informal mechanisms tend to be very illiquid as in the 
case of saving groups or ROSCAS, where the saver must wait until luck 
or a predetermined schedule of payouts determine if it is his or her turn 
to receive the pot.
Beyond their proximity to unbanked clients, informal services have 
several other advantages when reaching the unbanked. They tend to be 
very flexible and innovative, as they emerge and adapt to the specific 
needs of the population they serve (Pagura, 2008). Susu collectors in 
Africa, for example, charge a fee to collect very small deposits over the 
course of a month (sometimes daily) and keep them safe. Households 
demand these services—which are prohibitively costly for a formal insti-
tution to supply—as a way to self-impose a commitment device to save 
or to keep savings out of the hands of family or friends.
Although financial inclusion efforts tend to focus on providing for-
mal financial services, formal financial institutions are starting to link 
up with informal providers so they can reach clients they would other-
wise find extremely hard to serve due to lack of infrastructure and local 
knowledge.
The “informalization” of formal financial services is happening around 
the world. In Ghana, two private banks are using susu collectors to mobi-
lize savings, while in Jamaica, the Workers Bank created a product that 
mimics ROSCAs. In the Philippines, formal sector banks extend loans to 
informal lenders, creating a system of credit-layering that allows them to 
increase their outreach in rural settings by reducing problems of infor-
mation, monitoring, and enforcement (Floro and Ray, 1997). In Bolivia, 
a nonregulated microfinance institution providing nonfinancial services 
to its clients created over 20 linkages with a variety of actors, including 
private sector firms such as Western Union and utilities companies. The 
microfinance institution was then an effective means for formal institu-
tions to reach rural populations (González-vega and Quirós, 2008).
Even though banking low-income populations may not be profitable 
per se, banks are realizing that supplying additional financial instruments 
such as credit and insurance is a very attractive business opportunity. Their 
ability to serve the poor on a large scale can thus become profitable. After 
all, the poor are an important share of the population in Latin America and 
the Caribbean: between 60 percent and 70 percent of the population lives 
on less than US$10 a day (in purchasing power parity terms).
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Formal providers willing to go the extra mile may learn from the 
successful experiences of informal providers of financial services. First, 
banks can build on the existing supply of informal financial services. This 
strategy may help generate trust among unbanked clients, which is an 
important access barrier in the region.
Second, formal financial institutions can find ways to extend their 
outreach by merging with or sponsoring other informal providers that 
have comparative advantages in the market. The formalization of these 
providers can help reduce the risks and insecurities associated with infor-
mal mechanisms. These alliances can also help formal institutions reduce 
the upfront information and search costs that bancarizing entails.17 Part-
nerships with informal institutions that have already assumed the sunk 
costs of banking someone (including educating the client and building a 
credit history) may reduce the costs of formal providers trying to reach 
the unbanked.
Finally, the design of formal products should be inspired by informal 
products currently being offered, which have been directly shaped by 
people’s demands over time.
Getting an Early Start
Given the importance of behavioral biases to saving, directing interven-
tions at children makes sense. Influencing the behavior of children is 
certainly easier than changing the bad habits of adults. Evidence from 
developmental psychology and neuroscience (Henrichs and van den 
Bergh, 2015) indicates that self-regulation or self-control is governed by 
the prefrontal cortex, which can start to develop as early as in utero 
and continues into early adulthood. Environmental factors can influ-
ence both gene expression and neural specialization (Meaney and Szyf, 
2005; Henrichs and van den Bergh, 2015); this opens up the possibility 
of conducting early interventions among children and youth, while the 
prefrontal cortex is still developing. Self-control is an important trait for 
humans in many dimensions of their lives well beyond saving choices; it 
is thus urgent to learn about interventions that are successful in mediat-
ing the perverse effects of genetic predispositions.
However, empirical evidence on interventions that can either gener-
ate supportive environments for young people with a higher propensity 
to save or minimize the effects of genetic predispositions to save little is 
still scarce. Some exceptions are found in Jamison, Karlan, and Zinman 
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(2014), Karlan and Linden (2014), and Berry, Karlan, and Pradhan (2012), 
but their results are far from promising.
Brazil is including financial education in the curriculum of public 
high schools in the context of a National Strategy for Financial Educa-
tion (ENEF). Initial results are promising (Bruhn et al., 2013). Several 
governments in Latin America and the Caribbean are following suit. Edu-
cation ministers have yet to explore the best way to develop the specific 
financial literacy component to be included in the public high school 
curriculum, as well as adequate teaching materials.
Modifying time-preferences or saving attitudes to increase the pro-
pensity to save is not an easy task. Little is known about the best time 
to get started (whether with younger children in primary school and/or 
older children in secondary school); the length of exposure to environ-
ments that are conducive to improving self-control; or the experiences 
that moderate propensities to save, among others.
Pioneering work along these lines is being undertaken by some 
nonprofit microfinance institutions in the region, including FINCA Peru 
and ADRA Peru (see Box 9.2). Monitoring, evaluating, and experi-
menting along the lines of these efforts is crucial to better understand 
the impact that early interventions may have on saving choices. More 
research on the intersection of economics, neuroscience, and psychol-
ogy is also needed to better understand the effects of environmental 
factors on genetic traits.
Redefining Financial Inclusion
Financial inclusion has often been viewed narrowly as households’ abil-
ity to obtain access to credit. For decades, MFIs focused their efforts on 
easing the credit constraints of poorer households that lacked access to 
formal financial systems (Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman, 2015; Banerjee 
et al., 2015; Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman, 2015). In recent years, how-
ever, the concept of financial inclusion has expanded. Financial inclusion 
efforts now recognize the role of savings as a development tool and 
understand that households face strong constraints to save.
The initial focus of financial inclusion was on lifting supply-side con-
straints by trying to expand the use of formal financial services among 
the unbanked. Around the developing world, governments energeti-
cally promoted simplified saving accounts.18 These efforts have helped 
bank the unbanked. However, demand-side constraints also restrict 
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households’ ability to save—particularly through formal instruments. 
Even when households have a bank account, they may be unable to 
reach their saving goals because of demand-side constraints, such as 
social pressure to lend to friends and family, lack of knowledge and/or 
information, and behavioral biases.
Any national financial inclusion strategy that seeks to go beyond 
counting the number of accounts opened must consider the factors that 
limit household savings. On the one hand, formal financial institutions 
should continue to design simple, easy-to-use saving products that meet 
the demands of households. On the other hand, financial services must 
take into account the interaction between saving and credit constraints 
in a given market, and the effects on households’ financial portfolios 
BOX 9.2. IN PERU, NEVER TOO YOUNG TO SAVE
Microfinance institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean have usually pro-
moted the development of saving habits among their clients, who are primarily 
female microentrepreneurs. In recent years, some institutions have extended 
their focus to the children and grandchildren of these women by providing 
programs and products designed to help children save. In Peru, for example, 
FINCA Peru has implemented a program developed by the nongovernmental 
organization Aflatoun in rural areas for primary and secondary students and is 
providing saving instruments to their clients’ children.
Another example in Peru’s peri-urban and rural areas is the village bank-
ing program of the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). 
After a few years as a pilot, the institution launched a product designed to 
teach children saving habits by directly helping them save. The product is 
offered to their clients’ children and grandchildren aged 0 to 18. Children 
who participate choose a specific saving goal, label a moneybox provided 
by ADRA with their goal, and start a cycle of monthly deposits during the 
village bank meetings. The children cannot withdraw their funds until they 
have reached their goal. In the meantime, they earn interest, as the funds can 
be used to extend loans to bank members. The moneyboxes help the chil-
dren achieve their goals and avoid temptations to withdraw funds between 
deposits. ADRA also offers a training component for the children’s mothers 
and grandmothers that emphasizes the crucial role they play in promoting 
their children’s saving habits.
Although the effect of the program has not been evaluated, the rapid ex-
pansion of the portfolio of young clients is encouraging. Between December 
2012 and June 2015, the number of children in the program grew from 882 
to 3,831, and total savings accumulated by these young clients increased 
sixfold. As of June 2015, the average stock of savings per child was about 
US$28.
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and their demand for financial services. Although credit and saving are 
often viewed as opposites, they are really two sides of the same coin: 
households choose to save and borrow simultaneously. When house-
holds need money, both instruments provide a tool to finance lump-sum 
expenditures, since they both require a regular schedule of deposits and 
facilitate a single withdrawal at a given point in time (Afzal et al., 2015).
Dealing with saving barriers is harder than expanding the presence of 
banks through agent banking services. Demand-side constraints require 
well-crafted policy interventions capable of altering behavior. Affecting 
people’s beliefs and preferences is not an easy task, but the potential 
returns of such interventions may be large—for individuals, households, 
and the development of their countries.
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Notes
1 Frisancho (2016) summarizes recent experimental evidence on inter-
ventions that tackle a variety of saving constraints discussed in this 
subsection, including transaction costs, lack of trust and regulation, 
information and knowledge gaps, social pressure and behavioral 
biases.
2 See Chapters 3 and 11 for an overview of the main factors that drive up 
bank costs in Latin America and the Caribbean.
3 See Chapter 11 for other issues related to regulation barriers.
4 Nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of the annual consumption of people 
under 24 in Latin America and the Caribbean is financed by other 
members of the household, according to National Transfer Account 
(NTA)’s data. The elderly, on the other hand, give up 12% of their 
annual consumption in the form of private transfers (see http://
www.ntaccounts.org/doc/repository/NTA%20Data%20Sheet.pdf).
5 These conclusions are drawn from an experiment in Kenya by Jakiela 
and Ozier (2016). Preliminary results from a similar experiment in Sen-
egal confirm these patterns (Boltz, Marazyan, and villar, 2015).
6 Data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
7 See Ortigueira and Siassi (2013) for more details on an intra-house-
hold insurance model.
8 A word of caution is in order. Janssens, Kramer, and Swart (2015) 
discuss in detail the problems that arise when measuring hyperbolic 
discounting through hypothetical choices in a one-time cross sec-
tion. They argue that agents’ level of patience may change because 
their preferences are unstable over time rather than because of 
present-bias. To measure time inconsistency accurately, the authors 
recommend relying on a longitudinal design that allows stationar-
ity, time consistency, and time invariance to be disentangled. To the 
extent that agents incorporate the probability of changing environ-
ments in their answers to one-time experiments, future efforts to 
measure time inconsistency should rely on longitudinal data when 
possible.
9 For a model that shows why hyperbolic discounters cannot reach 
their predetermined choice of savings and how (costly) commitment 
devices are useful for them, see John (2014).
10 versions of this model exist throughout Latin America and the Carib-
bean. They have a variety of names: pandero or pandeiro in Peru and 
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Brazil, juntas in the Dominican Republic, tandas in Mexico, and quiniela 
in several other countries.
11 For a review of the available commitment saving products in the 
region and their current challenges, see Martin (2014).
12 Multilateral Investment Fund’s ProSavings program has financed 
the development of saving groups as well as individual scheduled 
savings accounts in the region, with a particular focus on beneficia-
ries of cash transfer programs and recipients of remittances from 
abroad.
13 Thaler and Benartzi’s (2004) Save More Tomorrow™ does exactly this: 
not only are employees given the chance to commit themselves to 
save in advance, but permanence in the program is made the default 
option. The design takes into account the role of status quo bias. By 
doing so, the program has achieved high survival rates: 8 out of 10 
participants are still saving even after four pay raises.
14 Mullainathan and Shafir (2014) highlight that poverty can also impact 
individuals’ ability to process information, manage their time effi-
ciently, or resist temptation, thus limiting their ability to make sound 
financial choices, forecast, or plan ahead.
15 This is not surprising, given that this is a selected sample of people 
who had already opted into the formal financial system.
16 The Innovation for Poverty Action (IPA) Messaging Project rigorously 
tests varying contents and methods of delivery of reminders that pro-
mote financial inclusion efforts.
17 The externalities that deter financial institutions from providing the 
first loan to a poor individual or group with no previous credit his-
tory are described in Lanuza (2004). Once the investment to extend 
a loan to a client is made, other providers in the market have incen-
tives to poach the client and thus avoid the upfront costs paid by the 
first lender.
18 An example in India is the Prime Minister’s People’s Wealth Pro-
gram, (Pradhan Mantri’s Jan-Dhan Yojana), which planned to open 
75 million accounts in a first phase that ended August 2015. In Chile, 
Cuenta RUT, a simplified saving account offered by Banco Estado-
Chile’s National Bank, has positioned itself as the main means of 
payment and deposit accounts in the country. Many governments 
in Latin America and the Caribbean are also paying out conditional 
cash transfers through basic bank accounts, promoting the ban-
carization of the poorest segments of the population. Nevertheless, 
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an ongoing debate rages over the unintended effects of social assis-
tance programs on formal saving choices and trust in the formal 
financial system. In Argentina and Brazil, for example, the funds 
deposited into the formal account of beneficiary households are 
withdrawn whenever the household does not consume the total 
amount of the transfer during a given time frame. For a discussion 
on this topic, see Chapter 11.
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